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Antisocial behavior is an enormously costly social problem, but its origins are poorly understood. A new study
shows that prosocial and antisocial behaviors arise from individual differences in howwe represent the value
of others’ pain relative to our own potential gain, rather than from variability in the capacity for effortful
inhibitory control.‘‘Well there are good guys and
there are bad guys
And there are crooks and criminals
There are doctors and there are
lawyers
And there are folks like you and
me’’
Camper Van Beethoven, 1986
Human social behavior runs the gamut:
from ‘good guys’ to ‘bad guys’, with folks
like you andme in between. The existence
of inter-individual variation in human
moral behavior is self-evident; much less
so are the biological mechanisms that
drive such variability. Traditionally,
cooperation and other forms of prosocial
behavior have been thought of as
reflecting the ability to ‘put the brakes’
on inherently selfish or self-interested
responses. By extension, moral
transgressions and antisocial behavior
result when this inhibitory brake is
compromised [1,2]. More recently,
however, an alternative account of how
we make decisions to help or hurt other
people has emerged [3–5]: a key
component of this model is the idea that
people make decisions based on the
subjective value of different choice
options. Prosocial behavior arises when
people place higher value on options
associated with benefits to others versus
self, while antisocial behavior reflects the
opposite [4]. New work by Crockett et al.
[6], reported in this issue of Current
Biology, provides strong support for the
notion that prosocial and antisocial
behaviors arise from individual
differences in how we represent the value
others’ pain relative to our own potential
gain, rather than from variability in the
capacity for effortful inhibitory control.
Further, it sheds important new light onR600 Current Biology 25, R600–R620, July 20the neurobiological mechanisms that
underlie such decision-relevant social
value representations.
The experimental analysis of antisocial
behavior has been stymied by a very
basic measurement problem: how do we
recreate, in the lab, the conditions under
which people are incentivized to hurt
others in real life? Crockett et al. [6]
addressed this issue with an ingenious
experimental design. On each trial in their
task, participants played the role of
‘decider’ in a series of scenarios that
required balancing the value of monetary
gain for themselves against the value of
avoiding causing physical pain for either
themselves (50% of trials) or an
anonymous ‘receiver’ (50%). Choice
options were constructed as
combinations of shocks and money, and
the task was structured such that
subjects chose between a ‘default’ option
and an ‘alternative’ option. On half the
trials, the alternative option signaled more
shocks/more money; on the other half,
the alternative option signaled fewer
shocks/less money. This clever task
feature allowed the authors to separately
examine choices in which action versus
inaction was required to reap the benefits
of causing another more pain.
Another issue with tasks that putatively
measure antisocial behavior or
aggression is the cognitive opacity of their
output variables, such as choice
proportion and/or reaction time. Crockett
et al. [6] skillfully employed a novel
computational framework to finely parse
task performance. This allowed them to
distinguish between multiple latent
components of decision-making,
including the negative utility of causing
harm (here, indexed by the parameter k)
to oneself (kSelf) or to another (kOther). Prior, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reservedwork using this task produced the
important finding that, on the mean,
people will sacrifice more money to avoid
causing pain to others compared to
themselves (a phenomenon termed
‘hyperaltruism’ by the authors) [7].
In their new work, Crockett et al. [6]
employed the harm aversion task as a
framework to examine the causal
biology of antisocial behavior, using
pharmacological manipulations to
disambiguate the roles of serotonin and
dopamine in this phenomenon. Both
neurotransmitters have long been
implicated in antisocial behavior and
aggression. For example, preclinical and
human data have suggested that lowered
serotonergic transmission predisposes
aggression [8], but the nature of this
linkage remains unclear [9]. Likewise,
there is evidence that elevated
dopaminergic function is associated with
higher levels of impulsive antisocial
behavior [10,11], but the underlying
mechanisms for this effect have been
difficult to resolve. In the new study [6],
model-based behavioral parameters
were compared between subjects
who were given either citalopram
(a serotonin-selective reuptake inhibitor),
levodopa (which is metabolized centrally
into dopamine), or placebo.
Crockett et al. [6] found that subjects
given citalopram were willing to forgo
larger amounts of money in order to avoid
the administration of painful electric
shocks to both themselves and another
person, compared to subjects who
received a placebo. In other words,
transiently increasing central serotonin
levels increases harm aversion for both
self and other. However, modulating
serotonin levels had no effect on
hyperaltruism: the citalopram subjects
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harm aversion for self versus other. By
contrast, levodopa administration
selectively reduced hyperaltruism, such
that the typical pattern of increased harm
aversion for others compared to self was
abolished. Considering the known role of
monoamines in motor function and
response inhibition, it might be tempting
to attribute this effect to shifts in response
vigor or inhibitory control. However, the
clever inclusion of action versus inaction
trials (as noted above) permitted the
authors to definitively rule out this
alternative explanation.
These findings show that
monoaminergic transmission influences
prosocial and antisocial behavior by
modulating how we represent and
integrate value representations of
outcomes for ourselves and others. Of
course, no single study can do everything,
and the systems-level mechanisms
underlying these results remain unclear.
Future pharmaco-fMRI and PET studies
in humans could further illuminate the
large-scale circuits and specific signal
transduction pathways through which
monoamines act to influence valuation
during social decision-making. More
work is needed to confirm the intriguing
possibility, raised here and elsewhere
[12], that social behavior is motivated byCthe same fundamental, domain-general
mechanisms for value-learning and
updating that drive non-social
decision-making. It will be particularly
important to explore how interactions
between explicitly ‘social’ aspects of
cognition (such as theory of mind and
empathic resonance) and domain general
valuation processes influence themirrored
representation of harm costs outside of
self. That said, this work offers a strong
rebuttal to inhibition-based ‘brakes’
accounts of social decision-making, and
sheds important new light on the manner
by which serotonergic and dopaminergic
signaling shape social behavior.REFERENCES
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Erroneous kinetochore–microtubule interactions must be detected and corrected before a cell enters
anaphase to prevent chromosome mis-segregation. Two new studies describe an Aurora A-mediated
error correction mechanism based on the spatial position of a chromosome within the mitotic spindle.Faithful segregation of the chromosomes
toeachdaughter cell is anessential feature
of cell division. Failure to accurately
distribute the genomic material can result
in aneuploidy and can have catastrophicconsequences for the viability of a
cell or organism. To segregate the
chromosomes, microtubules emanating
from the spindle poles must attach to the
DNA through the kinetochore, a large,multi-protein complex assembled at the
centromere of each chromosome. Proper
segregation relies on the attachment of
each replicated sister chromatid (or, in
meiosis I, each homologous chromosome)2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved R601
